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Procedural Flexibilisation of Economic Redundancy 
in France and Italy
Diverging Reforms with a Common Objective*
Raphaël Dalmasso**
The law on economic redundancies has recently been greatly reformed in 
France and Italy. The changes have shared the same common goal of making 
contract termination easier and surer. But their content is very different. 
Indeed, through procedural reforms, legislation in the two countries attributes 
different, and even opposing, roles to judges and litigation. In doing so, the 
reforms demonstrate that the goals of flexibility and security are not in fact 
legally unambiguous as far as economic dismissal is concerned.
For 40 years, in about the same periods, France and Italy have pursued several reforms of their redundancy laws, especially concerning economic dismissals. 
Thus, France’s Law of 19731 relating to redundancy procedures drew on Italy’s reforms 
of 19662 of dismissals for fair subjective reasons and dismissals for fair objective 
reasons, as well as on the Workers’ Statute of 1970.3 Also, in 1975,4 both sets of laws 
were evolving more or less similarly under the influence of European law. Lastly, 
1. Law No 73-680 of 13 July 1973 changes the redundancy procedure, including preliminary steps of sending a letter 
of dismissal and the need to justify contract termination.
2. Law No 604/1966 of 15 July 1966 provides for the requirement to justify dismissals.
3. Law No 300/1970 of 14 May 1970 is commonly referred to as the “Workers’ Statute”. In particular, Article 18 of 
this Law organises the indemnity schemes of employees who are unfairly dismissed.
4. Directive No 75/129/CE of 17 February 1975 requires the introduction of a specific procedure for collective 
economic layoffs. The French Law of 3 January 1975 created a special legal regime for economic dismissals. In 
Italy, the parliament considered, incorrectly, that the Law of 1966 was in compliance with the Directive of 1975, and 
adapted its content minimally, only covering partial unemployment, in the Law No 164/1975 of 20 May 1975. After 
two convictions by the European Court of Justice (ECJ, 8 June 1982, case 91/81; ECJ, 6 November 1985, case 131/84), 
Italy fully transposed the Directive with Law No 223/1991 of 23 July 1991.
* Translation: Nicholas Sowels.
Article published in French in Travail et Emploi, no 142, avril-juin 2015.
** Université de Lorraine, associate researcher at the Centre d’études de l’emploi et du travail (CEET), member of 
the Institut François-Gény; Raphael.dalmasso@univ-lorraine.fr.
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at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s, while France modified its economic 
redundancy procedures in 1989,5 creating social redundancy packages, economic 
redundancy in Italy still seemed to be entirely grounded in the Law of 1991.6
In Italy in 20127 and in France in 2013,8 laws on economic redundancy were again 
strongly reformed. Despite some considerable nuances, the aim of these reforms was 
comparable, the point being to make redundancies for economic motives more flexible 
and safer for employers especially (Part I). However, if we look at the role of litigation 
and the power of control by judges, it is clear that these two countries have adopted 
opposing procedures. This indicates that the legal flexibilisation of work contracts 
may take different forms. Such plurality is explained by the differences in targets. 
In the case of French law, one set of actors –judges– are suspected of exercising too 
much control over redundancy procedures. In Italy, Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute 
is held to be too favourable towards employees (Part II). Both reforms to flexibilise 
dismissals on economic grounds, however, risk leading to mixed results in the two 
countries. It is far from sure that litigation or judicial control will be less important in 
France in the future. In Italy, the 2012 reform has already been called into question 
since the end of 20149 (Part III).
Procedural Flexibilisation
Recent reforms of economic redundancies have not taken place in the same way 
in France and Italy. In Italy, the Berlusconi and then Monti governments modified 
the labour law to make it more flexible, under pressure from the country’s seriously 
worsened economic situation and in response to strong encouragement by the European 
Central bank. In France, the reasons for reform remain, even today, more ambiguous. 
However in both countries, legislators have chosen not to modify the definition of 
economic redundancy, but instead to concentrate on modifying procedures. These 
technical changes fundamentally alter the understanding and use of the law relating 
to economic redundancy.
5. Law No 89-549 of 2 August 1989 relating to the prevention of economic redundancies and the rights of job 
conversion.
6. Law No 223/1991 mentioned above.
7. Law No 92/2012 of 28 June 2012 relating to labour market reform from a growth perspective.
8. Law No 2013-504 of 14 June 2013 relating to the securing of employment, the translation of the National 
Interprofessional Agreement (NIA; accord national interprofessionnel – ANI) of the 11 January 2013 so that a new 
economic and social model supports company competitiveness and greater employment security, as well as career 
paths for employees.
9. Law No 183/2014 of 10 December 2014 (see the Jobs Act); Decree of the Law No 23/2015 of 4 March 2015.
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Two Reforms on a Different Scale
Italy’s reform in 2012 and France’s in 2013 have very different legal fields of 
application. I will only examine here procedures relating to economic redundancy. 
Other aspects will be mentioned, but not in detail.
In Italy, the Law of 201210 reforming the labour market mainly concerns redun-
dancy law,11 and its procedures.12 Compared to French law, these changes relate not 
just to economic dismissals, because they also concern redundancies for individual 
reasons and discriminatory dismissals. The reform of the labour market was therefore 
designed as an overall reform of redundancy.
In France, the Law on safeguarding employment of 4 May 2013 is quite a faithful 
translation of the National Interprofessional Agreement of 11 January 2013, which 
aims at reforming the labour market. The text however has quite a different aim to 
its Italian equivalent. Apart from economic redundancies, the changes to legislation 
relate to a variety of areas: vocational training, part-time work, part-time activity, 
the development of “job retention” agreements, rights concerning unemployment 
insurance renewal, complimentary health insurance, etc. Economic redundancy and 
its procedures are therefore only one aspect of the 2013 reforms, even if for many com-
mentators (for example, Fabre 2013) they are the most important and most expected 
changes. By contrast, personal dismissals were not changed.
For both legal systems, only looking at changes concerning economic redundancy 
would therefore appear to be a simplification, because it does not allow the overall 
logic of each measure, resulting from unprecedented compromises, to be taken into 
account. However, in terms of comparing rights, it is necessary to look at similar 
issues, in this case the law on economic redundancy which experienced changes in 
procedures in both countries. The comparison conducted here refers to the functional 
equivalence method presented by Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kötz (1998). These 
authors start from the idea that modern legal systems face the same problems. They 
can solve these with procedures, types of standards, or even different legal categories.13 
Accordingly, it is useful to compare laws by starting with one or several functions (the 
principle of functionality), in order to take into account all the sequencing norms of 
each function. French law refers to the notion of redundancy on economic grounds, 
10. Law No 92/2012 of 28 June 2012, mentioned above.
11. The law also provides for important changes in the definition of certain contracts for special jobs; it also modifies 
the part-time unemployment regime and extends this to unemployment insurance for all employees.
12. The 2012 reform was completed and detailed by a « decreto lavoro» (“Labour decree”) No 34 of 20 March 2014, 
notably for fixed term contracts.
13. For a similar approach, see also David (1950, pp. 10-11): “The comparatist researcher –I mean here lawyers who 
wish to use a comparative methodology– must avoid these errors. He/she must recognise the theory of law sources 
accepted by lawyers of the country he/she wishes to study: he/she must study foreign law as a foreign lawyer would. 
The principles guiding the researcher […] are those which should guide the historian of law. […] The comparatist 
must drop her natural tendency, as a French researcher, to study foreign law using the methods applied to research of a 
French law. He/she should not consider that her usual technical research and interpretation processes have a universal 
value. Acting in a different way to this implies wanting to open all locks with the same key.”
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whereas Italian law refers to redundancy for objective reasons,14 and the collective 
redundancy of employees to reduce staff.15 The “economic redundancy” category is 
thus not constructed in the same way in France and Italy (Dalmasso, 2009). But both 
legal systems have a body of texts relating to the same function, namely organising 
economic redundancies.
Italy: Assumed Flexibilisation
A large part of Italian law on redundancies is not codified, resulting instead from 
scattered laws which are often old.16 As noted above, three principal laws passed in 
1966, 1970 and 1991 are relevant to this study.
The Law No 604/1966 of 15 July 1966 defines individual redundancy. Its 
Article 117 provides that a redundancy needs to be justified by the employer to be 
valid. According to this article, the motive required for contract termination is not 
the same for the employer as it is for the employee: an employee who wants to end a 
permanent contract (PC) needs no justification. Article 3 on the other hand defines what 
a “just reason” for redundancy is: “redundancy for a just reason with prior notice is 
determined by the clear failure by the employee to carry out the obligations stemming 
from the employment contract, and its regular operation.” This article also provides for 
two types of redundancy. In view of simplification, the Italian authors most frequently 
evoke, in the first case, redundancy “for a subjective just reason.” The second case 
involves redundancy “for an objective just reason.” This practice goes back to the 
creation of the law and is so established that the distinction between “objective” and 
“subjective” redundancies seems commonly accepted today. This “objective” just 
reason for redundancy may be assimilated, with only a few qualifications (dalmasso, 
2009, pp. 42 et seq.; pp. 203 et seq.), to redundancy for individual economic reasons 
in French law.
French law only provides a definition of economic dismissal,18 be it individual or 
collective. By contrast, Italian law provides a specific definition of collective economic 
redundancy in Article 24 of Law No 223/1991 of 23 July 1991. This article indicates 
that “the measures provided in Article 4, paras. 2 to 12 and para. 15a, and Article 5, 
paras. 1 to 5,19 apply to all companies with more than 15 employees which, following 
14. Law No 604/1966 of 15 July 1966, mentioned above.
15. Law No 223/1991 of 23 July 1991, mentioned above.
16. There is no Labour Code in Italy, and the Codice civile is very limited as far as labour law is concerned.
17. « Nel rapporto di lavoro a tempo indeterminato, intercedente con datori di lavoro privati o con enti pubblici, ove 
la stabilità non sia assicurata da norme di legge, di regolamento e di contratto collectivo o individuale, il licenziamento 
non puo avvenire che per giusta causa ai sensi dell’articolo 2119 del Codice civile o per giustificato motivo »; “for 
permanent contracts, signed by private employers or public bodies and where contractual stability is not insured by 
the law, by a rule, or by a collective or individual contract, an employee can only be made redundant for a just reason 
as defined by Article 2119 of the Civil Code or for a justified motive” (texts in Italian were translated into French by 
the author, and retranslated into English by the translator).
18. Art. L. 1233-3, France’s Labour Code (Code du travail).
19. This refers to the procedure for consulting with unions, which is obligatory for collective redundancies.
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a reduction or a transformation in their business or work, plan to carry out at least five 
redundancies in a period of 120 days within the same establishment, or within the 
framework of several establishments situated in the same province. These measures 
are applied to any redundancy which, within the same time and framework, may be 
considered as the consequence of the same reduction or transformation of business. 
The measures of the first paragraph also apply when the employer wishes to cease 
activity.”20 These are collective redundancies, resulting either from a reduction or a 
transformation of business and work or a cessation of the company’s activity.
Lastly, Italian law on redundancy is regulated by the “Workers’ Statute,” defined 
by Law No 300/1970 of 14 May 1970. This text is especially important, because in 
Article 18 it sets out the principle of reinstating an employee dismissed wrongfully, 
under certain circumstances. From the 1990s onwards, this law was at the centre of 
debate about making redundancies more flexible. During the last 20 years, reforms 
of economic redundancy and its attendant indemnity schemes have been desired by 
governments on several occasions, only to be postponed or cancelled sine die. In 2001, 
a White Paper in particular presented by the Minister of Labour, Roberto Maroni, and 
followed up by a draft law,21 sought to reform Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute, with 
the aim of ending the reinstatement of dismissed workers. Strong opposition from the 
unions however forced Italy’s legislators to drop this reform.
During the summer of 2011, Italy experienced a very deep economic crisis, 
with the country being on the brink of default. On 5 August 2011, the European 
Central bank (ECB) sent a letter to the government of Silvio Berlusconi signed by 
Jean-Claude Trichet and Mario Draghi,22 calling on it to modify without delay the 
“recruitment and redundancy standards” to make these more flexible. This letter was 
meant to remain confidential, but was published in the Corriere della Sera during 
the month of September 2011. Following the fall of the Berlusconi government, the 
Monti government announced that changes had to be made in Italy’s labour law. A 
project to reform the labour market was then put forward by the Minister, Elsa Fornero, 
who consulted the unions formally and rapidly. The Fornero reform of the labour 
market was pushed through quickly in the form of the Law No 92/2012 of 28 June 
2012 and entitled « Disposizioni in materia di riforma del mercato del lavoro in una 
20. « Le disposizioni di cui all’articolo 4, commi da 2 a 12 e 15bis, e all’articolo 5, commi da 1 a 5, si applicano 
alle imprese che occupano più di quindici dipendenti e che, in conseguenza di una riduzione o trasformazione di 
attività o di lavoro, intendano effettuare almeno cinque licenziamenti, nel’arco di centoventi giorni, in ciascuna unità 
produttiva, o in più unità produttive nell’ambito del territorio di una stessa provincia. Tali disposizioni si applicano 
per tutti i licenziamenti che, nello stesso arco di tempo e nello stesso ambito, siano comunque riconducibili alla 
medesima riduzione o trasformazione. Le disposizione richiamate nel c. 1° si applicano anche quando le imprese di 
cui al medesimo comma intendano cessare l’attività. » 
21. Draft Law No 848-S.
22. Successive presidents of the ECB in 2011.
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prospettiva di crescita. »23 Article 124 of the law sets out the general approach of the 
text, namely the implementation of a labour market that is more inclusive and dynamic. 
The term “inclusive” indicates that legislators wanted to promote the integration into 
the labour market of excluded populations, while the term “dynamic” referred to 
blockages observed in the labour law. More specifically, the law aims at redistributing 
job protection more fairly; favouring the hiring of excluded workers; but also and 
above all, reviewing laws protecting the dismissal of employees. Legislators did not 
hide their intent: this law aimed at facilitating contract termination, or making labour 
contracts more flexible (speziale, 2012). The way to achieve this was by reforming 
economic redundancy procedures. The Laws of 1966 and 1991, which defined eco-
nomic redundancy, were not changed. Only the Workers’ Statute of 1970 was affected.
France: the Controversial Meaning of “Safeguarding”
In France too, the social partners and the legislature decided not to modify the 
legal definition of economic redundancies as set out in article L. 1233-3 of the Labour 
Code (Code du travail). In 2013, it was the procedure of collective economic layoffs 
that was changed profoundly.
The interpretation of this reform in France still varies considerably today according 
to the actors of the negotiations. As we will see below, for the CFDT union,25 the whole 
reform is favourable both to employers and employees, including the measures relating 
to economic redundancy. However, for the Medef (Mouvement des entreprises de 
France, the employers’ association), as well as for unions26 which did not sign the 
National Interprofessional Agreement of 11 January 2013 (Accord national interpro-
fessionnel du 11 janvier 2013), the agreement contains two distinct parts: i) aspects 
23. “Measures to reform the labour market in view of growth” (translations as above). For two presentations of the 
text see vidiri (2012) and scognamiglio (2012).
24. « La presente legge dispone misure e interventi intesi a realizzare un mercato del lavoro inclusivo e dinamico, 
in grado di contribuire alla creazione di occupazione, in quantita’ e qualita’, alla crescita sociale ed economica e 
alla riduzione permanente del tasso di disoccupazione, in particolare […] ridistribuendo in modo piu’ equo le tutele 
dell’impiego, da un lato contrastando l’uso improprio e strumentale degli elementi di flessibilita’ progressivamente 
introdotti nell’ordinamento con riguardo alle tipologie contrattuali ; dall’altro adeguando contestualmente alle 
esigenze del mutato contesto di riferimento la disciplina del licenziamento, con previsione altresi’ di un procedimento 
giudiziario specifico per accelerare la definizione delle relative controversie. » Translation summarised by the author 
(and translated into English by the translator): “The present law fixes measures aimed at implementing an inclusive 
and dynamic labour market, so as to contribute to job creation in terms of quantity and quality, to social and economic 
growth, and to the permanent reduction of the rate of unemployment, especially by redistributing job protection more 
equitably, on the one hand, by combating the incorrect use of certain flexibilities of particular types of contracts, and 
on the other hand, by adapting redundancy procedures to improve and accelerate the settling of disputes.”
25. Confédération française démocratique du travail.
26. This National Interprofessional Agreement was signed by the CFDT (Confédération française démocratique du 
travail), the CFTC (Confédération française des travailleurs chrétiens) and the CFE-CGC (Confédération française 
de l’encadrement-Confédération générale des cadres). For employers, it was signed by the Medef, the CGPME 
(Confédération générale des petites et moyennes entreprises) and the UPA (Union professionnelle artisanale). By 
contrast, the CGT (Confédération générale du travail) and the CGT-FO (Force ouvrière) did not sign the agreement.
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which protect employees, and ii) above all a form of contract flexibilisation which 
benefits employers through the reform of economic redundancy procedures.
One of the main negotiators of the agreement on behalf of the Medef has indicated 
therefore that “the idea behind the agreement can be summarised in one word: competi-
tiveness” (Foucher, 2013, p. 89). However, he also states that the agreement should be 
understood by distinguishing measures favourable to employees and those favourable 
to employers. He notes that employees benefit especially from complimentary col-
lective health care insurance, rechargeable rights to unemployment insurance and an 
individual training account (Foucher, 2013, p. 91). He notes that employers for their 
part have “never had an agreement or a law which provides so much new flexibility” 
and identifies for example agreements on internal mobility, job maintenance, the 
reform of partial unemployment, the introduction of prefixed delays,27 the reform of 
Labour Tribunal (conseil de prud’hommes) reconciliation, and the new rules framing 
job preservation schemes (Foucher, 2013, p. 92). Concerning all the measures linked 
to the law on economic dismissal, the author admits that they meet the employers’ 
demands and that the new standards facilitate economic redundancies by making them 
more flexible.
This reading of the agreement in terms of reciprocal concessions has been shared 
by one of the negotiators of the Force ouvrière union which did not sign the agreement. 
The excessive imbalance in concessions granted to employees and those given to the 
employers led this union to withhold its signature. The negotiator considered that the 
law on economic redundancy has become too flexible: “as part of the majority col-
lective agreement, the National Interprofessional Agreement undermines the individual 
rights of employees” (lardy, 2013, p. 103).
In contrast, in the CFDT magazine, Aurélie seigne and Emmanuelle pirat start 
by noting that the French labour market is seriously ill, and that it has de facto become 
very flexible, especially in the systematic use of precarious contracts. The authors 
specify therefore that “the CFDT wanted to address this reality first and foremost, 
by changing the situation of persons who bear the burden of the unacknowledged 
hyper-flexibility of the labour market. The CFDT fought with the employers during 
three months of negotiation in order to obtain satisfaction on four of its fundamental 
demands: the taxation of short-term contracts, a limit on imposed part-time work, 
rechargeable insurance rights for jobseekers, and the extension of complimentary 
health-insurance to all employees” (seigne, pirat, 2013, p. 14). The authors also 
indicate however that the “signed agreement […] reviews collective redundancy pro-
cedures to prevent aberrations such as the cancellation of social redundancy schemes 
years after workers have been laid off […]. Henceforth, the procedure and the content 
of job preservation packages will be negotiated on a majority basis, or controlled by 
27. In civil litigation, this involves a “delay/time-limit which if not respected constitutes grounds for refusing a case, 
which in turn results in the loss of the right to take legal action. In this case, the court can decide that the request is 
not admissible, regardless of its merits.” Source: Braudo S. (1996-2015), Dictionnaire du droit privé français. Online 
http://www.dictionnaire-juridique.com/definition/prefix.php (accessed 26 August 2015).
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public administrations. For the CFDT, this amounts to additional security for both 
employees and companies” (seigne, pirat, 2013, p. 16).
Like the social partners, France’s legal profession and doctrine are also divided. 
Some commentators consider that the reform’s main objective was to facilitate col-
lective redundancies (bonnechère, 2013; géa, 2013; Fabre, 2013; couturier, 2013). 
Others seek more to examine the practical reality of this flexibility (Jolivet, 2013; 
tarasewicz, 2013).
In summary, although everyone agrees that the French reform of economic 
redundancies seeks to provide greater security to employers, only some commentators 
believe that it also provides more safety for employees. This controversy already shows 
the contingent and ambiguous nature of the concept of security, which does not have 
the same meaning for employers and employees.
Both the French and Italian reforms strive to provide additional flexibility for 
economic dismissals, by making them safer, easier and more predictable for employers. 
However, the moves to greater flexibility in economic redundancies have not taken 
the same legal paths in France and Italy, as this comparison clearly shows. The role of 
tribunals in the new measures highlights these differences.
Opposing Procedural Choices
Both law systems have redesigned, directly and indirectly, the place of tribunals 
and judges in redundancies. In France, there has been a deliberate wish to reduce the 
involvement of the judiciary, and hence judges, in economic redundancies. Several 
tools have been mobilised jointly to this end. For their part, the reforms in Italy have 
centred on the question of reinstating laid-off workers.
France: Mistrust of Judges and Litigation
Several legislative changes have affected the role of judges in economic redun-
dancies to varying degrees.
Mistrust for judges felt by legislators is reflected in two ways which should not be 
confused or compounded. First, the new legal framework strives to make procedures 
safer in order to avoid litigation. The idea here is that an employer, if worried about 
facing too much litigation in case of economic redundancy, could hesitate in hiring 
workers. The new standards however also seek to reduce, to a certain degree, the powers 
of judges in controlling procedures.
Firstly, in order to clear out some litigation, deadlines for filing suits with tribunals 
have been reduced. The new Article L. 1471-1 of the French Labour Code henceforth 
stipulates that litigation relating to the execution or termination of a contract will be 
prescribed after two years from the day on which the party initiating litigation knew 
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or should have known about the facts on which litigation is based. For economic 
redundancies, the limitation period is even shorter: only one year. Within a few years, 
the time period for challenging redundancy has therefore fallen first from 30 years 
to 5 years, then to one or two years depending on the nature of contract termination. 
The prescription period in which employees can appeal has also been shortened, from 
five to three years (Art. L. 3245-1). It is this latter prescription period which, quite 
discreetly, risks having the greatest impact on litigation, and dissuading recourse to 
justice following redundancy. Indeed, very often employees do not dare to ask for 
payment of unpaid hours worked when their contracts are terminated. This is usually 
an ancillary claim coming on top of the main demand, for example, relating to chal-
lenging the real and serious motivation for dismissal. Shortening the prescription 
periods for appeal by employees from five to three years thus reduces their hope 
for winning litigation and may therefore dissuade them from taking cases to Labour 
Tribunals where procedures are always longer, more costly and uncertain. Shortening 
delays therefore seeks sometimes to neutralise and more often to dissuade litigation 
by employees before Labour Tribunals: why indeed go to court if the potential gain 
from the case has become so low? The new regime should therefore accelerate the 
fall in litigation before Labour Tribunals. This has already been observed since 2009: 
the number of new cases brought before Labour Tribunals fell by 23% between 2009 
and 2012, dropping from 228,901 to 175,714 (guillonneau, serverin, 2013, p. 7).
Secondly, judges at the High Court (tribunal de grande instance – TGI) have 
seen a substantial share of their competencies withdrawn, in favour of administrative 
tribunals. This apparently anodyne change in jurisdictional competency in fact hides 
a clear wish to tackle two former pieces of jurisprudence, without challenging them 
head-on, namely the Samaritaine and Alefpa rulings (see below). Such discreet chal-
lenging aims at limiting judicial control over redundancy schemes which are meant 
to safeguard employment too, so-called plans de sauvegarde de l’emploi in French 
or PSEs.
The High Court was traditionally responsible for collective labour litigation. It 
was therefore responsible for ruling on litigation concerning employment safeguard 
schemes, both in substance and summary form. Henceforth, administrative judges 
are competent to hear appeals against the decision to control the collective economic 
redundancy procedures carried out upstream by public administrations.28
From now on, the content of a PSE is set following two possible procedures: either 
through a majority collective agreement (prior to information-consultation of the works 
council as set out in Article L. 1233-24-1); or by default, on the basis of a unilateral 
document published by the employer following the last meeting of the works council 
(Art. L. 1233-24-1 to L. 1233-24-4). The appropriate public administration29 must 
28. The TGI retains residual competence over ligitation relating to collective agreements. It also keeps its competency 
over litigation relating to agreements to safeguard employment, in case these are incorrectly applied by employers.
29. This relates to the Regional Directorate for Companies, Competition, Consumption, Work and Employment 
(Direction régionale des entreprises, de la concurrence, de la consommation, du travail et de l’emploi – DIRECCTE).
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be informed of the steps taken by the procedure even before the formal information-
consultation of the works council (Art. L. 1233-57 et seq.). It will be responsible for 
evaluating the PSE via one or the other of the procedures selected, and the administra-
tion’s decision can, if necessary, be challenged in an administrative tribunal (instead 
of before the High Court). At first sight, such administrative evaluation seems to offer 
an appropriate solution, similar to the previous administrative control over economic 
redundancies.30 Yet, the scope of control set out in current law has led some commen-
tators to state that the law “substantially modifies the mission of the administration, 
transforming it into a rubber stamp for PSEs” (guiomard, serverin, 2013, p. 197). 
Intervention by the administration is set out in Articles L. 1233-57-1 to L. 1233-57-8. 
According to the terms of Article L. 1233-57-1, this consists essentially of “validating 
the agreement.” Alternatively, if there is no majority agreement, the administration 
“approves the unilateral document.” To validate an agreement, the administrative 
authority only carries out checks for pure formal conformity (Art. L. 1233-57-2), 
with a short, 15-day time period. If there is no agreement, the approval of the unilateral 
document is not more thorough (Art. L. 1233-57-2): the delay is certainly longer, but 
remains intrinsically short (21 days).
The administrative decision may be challenged in the administrative tribunals. 
Administrative judges, however, only need to check that the administrative authority 
has respected Articles L. 1233-57-2 and L. 1233-57-3: i.e. check that the certification 
procedures have been correctly carried out. That said, one uncertainty remains con-
cerning the exact scope of the control. We will return to this below.
This procedural change seeks therefore to avoid most of the legal risks linked to 
the Samaritaine and Alefpa jurisprudence, based on the following key principals. The 
Samaritaine31 ruling asserts that if a redundancy scheme32 is deemed to be noncon-
forming by the TGI, the redundancies carried out as part of the scheme may also be 
annulled. As a result, France’s highest law court (Cour de cassation) ordered the judges 
of the TGI to scrutinise in detail the adequacy of the redundancy scheme in order to 
determine whether it was valid or not. If inadequate, the nullity of the scheme can be 
extended to all subsequent acts, especially dismissals undertaken by the employeur.33 
In the Samaritaine case, the TGI ruled that the PSE was null and void. The Labour 
Tribunal, before which the case was finally brought individually by the employees, did 
not rule that the redundancy scheme was null and void, but only on the consequences 
of the nullity of the dismissals. This raises the question of what an employee can 
do believing a PSE to be null and void, and so her/his dismissal as well, in the case 
where litigation to establish nullity has not been lodged with the TGI. The Cour de 
30. Administrative control of economic redundancies existed between 1975 and 1986.
31. Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 13 February 1997, “Samaritaine”, Bulletin civil, Ve partie, no 64.
32. The former name of redundancy schemes to safeguard jobs.
33. In law, nullity is a retroactive principle: a dismissal judged as null and void is deemed never to have taken place, 
entailing the reinstatement of the employee.
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cassation pursued this reasoning to the end, by indicating, in its ruling on Alefpa,34 that 
“employees dismissed on economic grounds have an individual right to claim that their 
dismissal is void in the light of the provisions in Article L. 321-4-1.” Thus, even though 
the works council has the function of defending employees collective interests during 
collective redundancy schemes, and in particular may point to possible deficiencies 
of a redundancy plan to safeguard employment, this does not deprive employees of 
their personal and legitimate interests to challenge their dismissal before the Labour 
Tribunal, on the grounds of the PSE’s insufficiencies.
The new procedure has consequences for individual and collective litigation over 
PSEs.
Concerning individual litigation, it blocks a large share of cases requesting the 
annulment of redundancy going to court, with redundancy schemes being controlled 
and validated by the administration beforehand. A redundancy scheme that has been 
validated can no longer be challenged by an employee before the Labour Tribunal. 
This makes the procedure safer for the employer.
The consequences are even more important for collective disputes. This is because 
now any challenge in interim proceedings –before the administration has controlled the 
redundancy scheme– is impossible. Previously, in the event of a manifest inadequacy by 
the company to provide for employment safeguards as part of its redundancy scheme, 
the employees’ representative bodies could lodge a case before the TGI without delay, 
in order to suspend the collective dismissal procedure. Such actions had the automatic 
effect of postponing indefinitely redundancy schemes, sometimes for years in cases 
where an employer repeatedly breached legal obligations, in particular regarding 
information and consultation of works councils, or if the scheme took inadequate steps 
to safeguard employment. Henceforth, collective actions to challenge a redundancy 
procedure can only take place once control by the administration has been carried out. 
The aim is to avoid sometimes lengthy litigation, as occurred for years when trade 
unions and employee representative bodies challenged Goodyear’s successive versions 
of a redundancy scheme aimed to safeguard employment (PSE).35
These changes show that it has been possible to modify the law on economic 
redundancy without altering the definition of economic motivation, nor even delib-
erately censoring the jurisprudence of the Samaritaine and Alefpa cases, simply by 
seeking to reduce litigation or making preliminary proceedings impossible.
34. Cour de cassation, chambre sociale, 30 March 1999, “Alefpa”, Bulletin civil, Ve partie, no 144.
35. After seven years of litigation, the proceedings between certain unions and the management of Goodyear were 
brought to an end in January 2014 with the unions signing a protocol to end the dispute, accepting the final version of the 
PSE put forward by the employer. For more information about this case, see the Commission of enquiry by the French 
Parliament “relating to the causes of the project to close the Goodyear factory at Amiens-Nord and its economic, social 
and environmental consequences, and the lessons that can be learned linked to the representative nature of the case”: 
see the website of the Assemblée nationale: http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/dossiers/fermeture_usine_goodyear.
asp (accessed 16 June 2015).
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According to certain authors, judges are seen as “obstacles” in applying this new 
law on economic dismissal (grevy, henriot, 2013), whereas their primary function 
under the rule of law is to rule on litigation, and hence resolve conflicts, thereby 
restoring a certain form of social peace via the law.
Italy: a –Provisional– Reassertion of the Role of Judges
In Italy, the reform of collective economic redundancies is based on Article 18 
of the Workers’ Statute. The changes set out in 2012 give more power to judges in 
assessing the legitimacy of redundancy plans. To understand these, it is necessary to 
examine the situation beforehand.
When dismissal was shown to be unjustified, the impact on indemnities varied 
according to company size. Legislation provided for two types of possible “protection” 
(tutela) for an employee dismissed without reason, namely: real protection (tutela 
reale) and obligatory protection (tutela obbligatoria). Depending on the situation, 
they could lead to compensation, reinstatement or re-hiring. The indemnity regime 
was profoundly modified by the Fornero reforms.
Under Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute of 1970, real protection was based on 
the principle of an employee being reinstated in her/his job (reintegrazione nel posto 
di lavoro) in cases of unfair dismissal. Such real protection also made provision for 
the employer being sentenced to pay damages (risarcimento del danno) equal to at 
least five months’ salary, possibly even more in the case of wrongful behaviour by the 
employer, and for any other proven prejudicial action. Moreover, the employer had 
to pay wages during the period of breach of contract. An employee who did not want 
to return to her/his job had the possibility of asking for compensation equal to at least 
fifteen months’ pay. This real protection provided a strong guarantee against unfair 
dismissal, with a clear cost to employers. The real protection regime was applicable 
in the three following situations:36 i) if the employer had more than 15 workers (or 5 
in the case of an agricultural firm) in each production unit, or office or establishment 
(ufficio); ii) if the employer had more than 15 workers (or 5 in the case of an agricultural 
firm) in the same commune, even if they were spread across several production units 
or establishments; and iii) if the employer had more than 60 employees.
By contrast, the obligatory protection regime applies to situations not covered by 
real protection, and has not been changed.
Compulsory protection provides ordinary protection (droit commun in French) 
against unfair dismissals, under Article 8 of Law No 604/1966 amended by Article 2 
of Law No 108/1990. In the event of a ruling declaring a dismissal as wrongful, the 
employer is obliged to re-employ (riassumere) the employee within three days or, if 
the employer considers it more desirable, to compensate the employee for her/his loss 
36. Article 18, para 1, Law No 300/1970. This point was not changed by the 2012 reform, but relegated to the end 
of the Article.
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by paying an indemnity of between two-and-a-half months to six months’ salary. This 
is calculated on the basis of the number of employees in the company, the seniority 
of the dismissed employee and any errors committed. The employer therefore has a 
choice between paying compensation and re-employing the worker. The employee 
may also, if necessary, refuse to be reinstated, and prefer to receive compensation. 
But the employee does not have the possibility of seeking re-employment instead of 
compensation. Obligatory protection is therefore weaker for the employee, as he/she 
cannot refuse contract termination if the employer does not want to rehire him/her.
The 2012 Fornero reform changed Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute profoundly, 
and reduced employees’ “real protection” following dismissal. The reinstatement 
or indemnity depends on the nature of the dismissal.37 For example, in the case of 
discriminatory dismissal, reinstatement remains possible. For economic redundancy, 
the new legal regime is hardly straightforward. In the case of individual economic dis-
missal (giustificato motivo oggettivo38) deemed wrongful, the employer is in principle 
no longer bound to reinstate the employee but must pay an indemnity of between 15 
and 24 months’ salary. Legislators have thus clearly put an end to the real protection of 
the employee which involved reinstatement in the event of economic dismissal devoid 
of a “real and serious cause” (to drawn on French categories, perhaps incorrectly). By 
doing so, the legislation now meets longstanding employer demands39 which criticized 
the reinstatement regime.
However, if it is established that the objective fact leading to dismissal is not 
only wrongful but also manifestly non-existent,40 then the judge may still order the 
reinstatement of the employee.
The collective economic redundancy regime was also changed by the reform. 
In the case of dismissals being “ineffective”41 from a procedural point of view, i.e. if 
the employer has not respected the rules framing the procedures for collective redun-
dancy for example, a judge may sentence the employer to paying compensation to the 
employees equal to between 6 and 12 months’ wages.
The reform is most interesting concerning controls of motivations for individual 
economic dismissal. Although it deliberately makes contract termination more flexible, 
by ending the principle of systematic reinstatement in favour of compensation, the new 
37. Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute has had no less than seven paragraphs added to it, distinguishing the various 
modalities for sanctions, depending on the types of wrongful dismissal. See de luca (2013).
38. As we have seen, dismissal for a just objective motive is not entirely the same as dismissal on economic grounds 
in French law. On this see, see Dalmasso, 2009, p. 32 et seq.
39. The former Director-general of the Cofindustria (Italy’s employer organisation). Thus in 2003, S. Parisi wrote: 
« abolire l’art. 18 è un atto di civiltà » (“abolishing Article 18 is proof of civilisation”). See « L’affondo di Parisi : 
l’obiettivo è abolire l’art. 18 », Corriere della sera, 12 June 2003, p. 9.
40. In fact, legislators created two levels of wrongful economic dismissal, with different consequences for compensation. 
As we shall see, the difference between the two levels is largely a matter for judges to decide.
41. The Italian term « inefficace » cannot be translated by the word “ineffective”, because dismissal takes place and 
has a legal impact (contract termination) without reinstating the employee. Thus, it seems fairer to translate the term 
using “irregular” (or « irrégulier » in French legal terminology) or indeed “inoperative”, to stick as closely to the 
Italian as possible.
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law leaves judges with unprecedented room for manoeuvre. The judge may order rein-
statement in case he/she rules that the grounds for economic dismissal are manifestly 
inexistent or unfounded, though if the dismissal is merely judged as being wrongful, 
then the company pays compensation. Thus, in 2012, the judges acquired wide powers 
for adjusting sanctions against employers, powers that are far greater than in France. 
Flexibility has therefore been strengthened by using the judiciary. As we shall see 
below, however, this reform was only applied finally for two years.
An Italian economist has pointed out, somewhat provocatively, that flexibility in 
labour relations is never enough (bruno, 1989, p. 33). This can indeed be seen in the 
French and Italian legal discourses on economic dismissal. Justifications are based 
on economics, namely that flexibility removes obstacles to hiring. But, in practice, 
flexibility takes varied, even contradictory forms. Here, we are faced with two similar 
legal and economic systems, marked by the same legal intention to make the labour 
market more flexible. But this has led to two opposing reforms concerning the role and 
usefulness of judges who are the central, legal actors. The point is not to determine 
which system is on the right or wrong track, but rather to underline the contingency 
of legal practices relating to the economic concept of flexibility, before we even move 
on to study the correlation between flexibility and employment.
These reforms need to be assessed, as far as possible, in terms of their results. It 
is still too early to fully analyse the application of these standards. It seems, however, 
that the Italian and French reforms are likely to generate side effects which were not 
foreseen by legislators; or “pockets of surprise” to use an expression coined by Gérard 
lyon-caen (2004). We can try to detect these.
Uncertain Results
Two different legal visions of flexibility correspond to two different sources of 
disagreement.
In Italy, the 2012 reform was considered as a failure by the Renzi government. 
The jurisprudence which had to be applied to the new Article 18 raised concerns about 
the legal uncertainty employers could face, and the development of jurisprudence 
that is too protective of employees. At the end of 2014 and in early 2015, the Renzi 
government therefore radically changed the procedure for economic redundancies. In 
France, the risk of failure also exists. It is not certain that litigation, particularly col-
lective litigation, will actually decrease. Similarly, it is not clear that the administrative 
courts will be more lenient towards employers than the TGI. This would undermine 
the link between flexibility and security.
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A New Reform in Italy
Overall, the 2012 reform has not been well received within Italy’s legal profession 
and doctrine.42 Alberto valenti (2012, pp. 243 and 248) notes, for example, that this 
reform constitutes a departure from the previous evolution of Italian law, which sought 
to limit judges’ powers in economic redundancies. He recalls that a decree of 200343 
specifies how a judicial review cannot extend to the examination of assessments, nor to 
technical, organisational and production choices. The jurisprudence of Italy’s Highest 
Court (the Supreme Court of Cassation) supports this view of the law, backing the idea 
that employers should not be controlled in their management practices (insindacabilità 
delle scelte imprenditoriali). In contrast, the 2012 Law requires judges to exercise 
narrower and deeper control over management choices, by imposing an obligation 
to differentiate between unfair economic dismissals and economic redundancies that 
clearly do not exist.
The distinction between unfair dismissals and economic redundancies that clearly 
do not exist is, according to legal doctrine, the main source of insecurity. Franco 
carinci (2012, p. 4) has even accused legislators of having fabricated a legal monster 
–à la Dr. Frankenstein– that is very difficult to understand and to apply. Some decisions 
by grass-roots judges44 have begun to set out, in an imperfect manner, the assumptions 
on which judges may order reinstatement (marinelli, 2013, p. 2).
Faced with these uncertainties, legislators and the new government headed by 
Matteo Renzi undertook a new reform of the methods of control and compensation 
of the economic redundancies to be applied by judges. The Law of 10 December 
2014,45 commonly known as the “Jobs Act”,46 led to a massive but brief general strike 
in December 2014.
Article 7c modifies the system of penalties for economic redundancies for persons 
hired as of the date of the Law’s application. The purpose of this article is “to strengthen 
job opportunities in the world of work for persons looking for a job.”47 In particular, for 
“permanent contracts” it provides for the creation of a new type of contract: a “con-
tract with rising protection.”48 This contract excludes the reinstatement of employees 
dismissed unfairly, but provides for guaranteed compensation, which increases with 
42. For a critical view of changes in Italy’s overall labour law, see especially perulli (2012).
43. Legislative decree No 276/2003.
44. In particular, the Milan tribunal (20 November 2012) has considered that non-respect of the obligation to retain 
(or relocate) an employee, as well as infringements of the redundancy procedure (lack of reconciliation procedures) 
make redundancy wrongful, leading to damages. In contrast, when judges have ruled that reinstatement is not possible, 
then the justification for redundancy is clearly inexistent.
45. Law No 183/2014 of 10 December 2014.
46. For a discussion of this law in French, see ichino, martelloni (2015) and bini (2015).
47. « Rafforzare le opportunità di ingresso nel mondo di lavoro da parte di coloro che sono in cerca di occupazione. » 
(Translations as above.)
48. « Contratto a tutele crescent. » (Translations as above.)
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seniority.49 The Legislative Decree of 04 March 2015 clarifies the content of this 
Law,50 and in particular the regime of “increasing protection” (tutesle crescent), which 
applies to employees hired on permanent contracts as from 7 March 2015. In order to 
encourage hiring, legislators have designed a new dismissal regime. For dismissals that 
are discriminatory or only verbal, the sanction remains reinstatement for all employees. 
For dismissals for disciplinary reasons, reinstatement is possible only if the material 
reason for dismissal is shown to be non-existent. In all other situations, and especially 
for all unfair economic redundancies, the concept of wrongful dismissal stands. The 
evolution here is important: reinstatement is impossible, yet compensation will depend 
on the rate imposed by the judge. The latter is fixed by the decree, and is equal to two 
months’ salary per year of service, with a minimum of four months paid compensation, 
and a maximum of twenty-four months.51
Two systems of compensation and control of individual economic redundancies 
thus now coexist: i) for contracts of indefinite duration signed before 7 March 2015, 
the legal regime remains that of the 2012 Fornero reform (in which judges play an 
important role in the choice of sanctions and compensation); ii) for contracts signed 
after the entry into force of the new law, reinstatement will no longer be possible in the 
event of wrongful economic dismissal, since judges can only order financial damages.
This last development of Italian law therefore largely eliminates the principle 
of reinstatement contained in Article 18 of the Workers’ Statute, in the event of eco-
nomic redundancy. In so doing, it limits the power of the courts in fixing the sanctions 
applicable as well as the amount of damages to be awarded. The Law’s control of the 
legitimacy of the economic grounds for dismissal should not, however, be affected.
France: Possible Resistance to Litigation?
It would be presumptuous to forecast how different actors (employees, unions, 
employers, administrations and judges) are likely to respond to the new redundancy 
procedure, and what its consequences will be, especially for litigation.
At the risk of being wrong, I nevertheless believe that the Law for securing 
employment could lead to some deceptions, for employees but especially for employers, 
and that it will not succeed entirely in its aims of reducing litigation over redundancies.
For employees, some of whom undertake individual legal action against economic 
redundancy, the main risk lies (as is already largely the case) in persons accepting 
economic redundancy without daring to challenge it in court. The reduction of limi-
tation periods and the prior validation by the administration of economic redundancy 
49. « Escludendo per i licenziamenti economici la possibilità della reintegrazione del lavoratore nel posto di lavoro, 
prevedendo un indennizzo economico certo e crescente con l’anzianità di servizio. » (Translations as above.)
50. Decree-Law No 23/2015 of 4 March 2015.
51. The idea of applying graded rates of indemnities for dismissals for no real or serious reason was adopted in France 
in July 2015, in the final version of the draft law on growth, activity and the equality of economic opportunities (see 
the following paragraph).
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procedures are likely to dissuade employees from legal action. I therefore expect a 
further reduction in litigation in Labour Tribunals, at least for economic redundancies. 
In fact, numbers have already fallen sharply: the number of claims for compensation 
following contract termination on economic grounds dropped from 4,875 in 2009 to 
2,497 in 2012 (i.e. −49%, compared to −23% for all cases going to Labour Tribunals):52 
such cases now only account for 1.4% of all actions brought before these Tribunals53 
(guillonneau, serverin, 2013, p. 8). This change is of course variously interpreted, 
depending on whether one looks at it from the standpoint of employees or employers. 
In the future for employers, it seems that economic redundancy will have little chance 
of being contested by employees. From this point of view, the legal safety of eco-
nomic dismissal has been acquired, but this was already the case before the reforms of 
2013. From the perspective of employees, does this mean that economic dismissal is 
henceforth better accepted? It is hard to answer this question. Let us simply note that 
an employee who gives up the possibility of going to court is likely to feel a certain 
degree of frustration vis-à-vis her/his employer, the redundancy law and even judges.
Although the actual risks of individual litigation are low, legislators have once 
more acted to make redundancies “safer”. Echoing Italian law, and so again indicating 
the strong interdependence between the law systems, the French government finally 
set a ceiling on indemnities. After two failed attempts in 201554 and 2016,55 it fixed 
a ceiling by Decree (Ordonnance) in 201756 on the compensation paid by employers 
in cases where Labour Tribunals ruled that redundancy is unfair (i.e. with no real 
or serious basis). Prior to this reform, French labour law did not set a limit on com-
pensation: judges ruled on the level of damages suffered by the employee following 
unfair dismissal, applying the general principle of full compensation for damages. 
Minimal compensation of six months pay did exist however for employees working 
in companies with eleven or more staff and with more than two years seniority.
Henceforth, the Decree caps compensation for unfair dismissal. For example, 
this ranges from one to twenty months pay, depending on seniority. The clearly-stated 
aim by the government is to limit costs for companies, and to encourage recruitment 
on open-ended contracts, even if the employer is not sure of being able to retain the 
52. A change partly due to the development during the period of approved terminations of collective agreements 
(ruptures conventionnelles homologuées), which have been in force since 2008.
53. This sharp drop is difficult to interpret. It may partly be due to the strong success of terminating approved collective 
agreements. In a certain number of cases, this could substitute for individual economic redundancies. Another, older 
factor for the drop stems from the fact that when dismissed on economic grounds, the employee may have subscribed 
to a contract providing professional security (contrat de sécurisation professionnelle), which gives him/her a number 
of advantages in job search. If the employee accepts this contract of professional security, then economic redundancy 
is qualified, somewhat artificially, by the Labour Code as a termination of contract “by mutual agreement”. This may 
(incorrectly) suggest that any legal challenge of the dismissal is not possible.
54. The Macron Law No 2015-990 of 6 August 2015, on growth, activity and the equality of economic opportunities.
55. The El Khomri Law No 2016-1088 of 8 August 2016 relating to work, the modernisation of social dialogue and 
the safeguarding of professional pathways.
56. Decree (Ordonnance) No 2017-1387 of 22 September 2017 relating to predictability and security of labour 
relations. The article was completed on 12 October 2017.
Raphaël Dalmasso
72  – Travail et Emploi – 2017 Special Edition
employee for a long time. The ceiling on compensation for dismissal without a real or 
serious cause meets two objectives: i) to allow employers to know better in advance 
the legal risks linked to redundancy and ii) by limiting compensation, to dissuade 
employees from litigating when the prospects of reward are too low. As economic 
redundancy is little contested, this reform will certainly impact most litigation for dis-
missals on personal grounds. It is still not sure that it will make the law more predictable 
and limit litigation. In fact, judges retain their full powers over compensation in certain 
cases (i.e. without a rate scale), especially when dismissal is ruled as discriminatory, 
in the event of an infringement of the right to strike or of some fundamental freedom. 
There is no doubt that specialised lawyers will frequently raise these exceptions in 
an attempt to obtain better compensation for their clients… leading to unprecedented 
forms of litigation.
However, according to the Law on securing employment, it was mainly collective 
litigation challenging redundancy schemes (the so-called employment safeguard 
schemes, or PSEs, see above) which was the most problematic. As already indicated 
here, such preliminary litigation has ended, as unions and employee representative 
bodies can only file lawsuits before an administrative tribunal, once the administration 
has ruled on the scheme. So what will be the reaction of unions or works councils? 
An initial assessment of the Law on safeguarding employment established on 3 April 
2015 by the Ministry of Labour57 identifies a “significant fall in the judicialisation of 
redundancy schemes” (p. 66 et seq.). The document states that there is an 8% rate for 
bringing PSE cases before the administrative tribunal, compared to the 25% rate of 
cases which went to the High Court prior to the Law on safeguarding employment. In 
cases of a majority agreement on the redundancy scheme (between the employer and 
employees), litigation is even less likely, with a rate of referral to the administrative 
tribunal of 5%. These figures seem to indicate that the aim of legislators has been 
achieved, at least partially. They should however be examined with some care. First, the 
law on safeguarding employment is still recent: the 1,14258 redundancy schemes which 
have been undertaken since the Law came into force do not yet allow final conclu-
sions to be drawn about the appropriation of this text by the various actors concerned 
(employers, employee representatives and employees themselves). Moreover and 
above all, comparing litigation before the administrative tribunal and the High Court 
is delicate, as previously there were two types of litigation (summary and substantive) 
before civil judges. Now there is only one type –substantive– before the administrative 
judge. To be fully relevant, a comparison therefore needs to look only at substantive 
litigation. But, the distribution between substantive and summary litigation before the 
High Court is not specified in the assessment.
57. Bilan de la loi de sécurisation de l’emploi du 14 juin 2013, France’s Ministry of Labour (ministère du Travail, 
de l’Emploi, de la Formation professionnelle et du Dialogue social). Online http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/
CONFERENCE_THEMATIQUE_DU_3_AVRIL_2015_-_Bilan_de_la_loi_de_securisation_de_l_emploi.pdf 
(accessed 17 June 2015).
58. 2016 figures when the first version of this text was achieved for its publication in French.
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In order to predict possible risks of litigation, it is surely necessary to distinguish 
between situations when there is a majority company agreement and when there is 
not, as indeed the assessment by the Ministry of Labour does.
In the absence of an agreement, with a document that has been unilaterally drafted 
by the employer, unions are unlikely to be satisfied with the application and content 
of the procedure, especially during the design of the PSE. They will tend to challenge 
the redundancy scheme in administrative tribunals. In this case, it may be considered 
that the employer has not sought to negotiate effectively (or faced unions unwilling to 
negotiate, etc.). The employer risks seeing the restructuring scheme challenged in court. 
The risk of litigation is therefore important given the worsening of industrial relations.
Legislators certainly consider that, in the case of a majority agreement, litigation 
would be weak, if not non-existent. To be sure, unions which are signatories of an 
agreement would be inconsistent were they then to challenge in court issues previously 
negotiated. However, unions not party to the agreement, possibly representing nearly 
half of all employees in a company, could still challenge the procedure. Significant 
litigation is therefore not to be ruled out. It would depend also and above all on the 
jurisprudence assembled before the administrative jurisdictions. In particular, if 
administrative tribunals seek to draw on previous jurisprudence developed by the High 
Court, which seems probable, it is likely that the efforts by the scheme to safeguard 
employment will be better controlled by administrative judges than by the admin-
istration itself. This could be a powerful incentive for unions to go before tribunals 
systematically.59 In this situation, the ideal of the de-judicialisation of economic 
redundancy procedures will not have got very far.
•
The reform in Italy was modified after two years, and the reform in France is likely 
to generate litigation as redundancy schemes safeguarding employment are challenged 
before administrative tribunals. Both examples therefore indicate the difficulties of 
transcribing into law the political will to make redundancy schemes more flexible while 
safeguarding employment. The aim of this article is not to judge such highly difficult, 
if not rash, undertakings which have sometimes been courageously led by legislators 
and the social partners. Instead it is to underline the inherent problems of designing, in 
legal terms, legislation promoting more flexibility and plasticity in terms of economic 
59. The draft law “on growth, activity and the equality of economic opportunities” may have anticipated this possible 
rise in litigation. Article 92 of the text adopted 9 July 2015 by the National Assembly aims to limit, in certain situations, 
the effects of annulment by the administrative tribunal of a decision to validate a PSE by the administration: “in case of 
annulment of a decision of validation mentioned in Article L. 1233-57-2 or approval mentioned in Article L. 1233-57-3 
due to insufficient reasons, the administrative authority will reach a new decision that is sufficiently reasoned, within a 
period of 15 days from the notification of the ruling by the administration. This decision is passed on by the employer to 
the dismissed employees, following the first decision of validation or approval, by all means which indicate a specific 
date for the information being passed on. Once the administrative authority has issued a new decision, the annulment 
only on the grounds of insufficient motives for the first decision by the administrative authority has no impact on the 
validity of the redundancy, and provides neither for reinstatement nor the payment of compensation by the employer.”
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redundancy. The legal contingency of this notion should lead to the utmost caution. 
Before any reform, it seems necessary to assess more than 20 years of strengthening 
flexibility in industrial relations. Such flexibility has indeed worn away the protection 
granted to employees with permanent contracts, especially in terms of contract ter-
mination. But, has it really encouraged more hiring? While economists have in fact 
already challenged this link (pucci, valentin, 2008), the idea that greater flexibility 
of labour law will help bring down unemployment has clearly been the leitmotif of 
these reforms. However, the difficulty, if not impossibility, of clearly formulating in 
law what flexible legislation actually is in reality should be enough to challenge this 
automatic link, “this scientific evidence”, that greater flexibility to terminate contracts 
will reduce constraints on hiring.
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